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to] assert the procedural bar and foreclose further consideration of Gray's
misrepresentation claim."
'57
The court found that Gray did not previously raise his misrepresen-
tation claim in any federal proceeding with "the clarity required by
Picard and Harless."58 Following the reasoning discussed in Picard, the
Harless Court, reversing the holdings of the district court and the court
of appeals, found that Harless did not "provide the state courts with a 'fair
opportunity' to apply controlling legal principles to the facts bearing
upon his constitutional claim."59 Hence, his federal writ of habeas corpus
was, likewise, barred.
60
In concluding that Gray did not raise his misrepresentation claim in
the district court or court of appeals, the court was correct. Gray
presented adequate facts on which to base his misrepresentation claim in
both proceedings, but it was not until he reached the United States
Supreme Court that he cited cases which directly supported his misrep-
resentation claim.6t Even if the court were to apply the more deferential
specificity standard found in Taylor, it does not appear that Gray had
articulated an adequate constitutional claim of misrepresentation in
either the district court or the court of appeals. Thus, the court's finding
that Gray had not raised his misrepresentation claim at a lower federal
proceeding and that the Commonwealth was, therefore, "free to maintain
its defense of procedural default," is adequately supported by prece-
dent. 62
57 Id.
58 Id. (see Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1971); Anderson v.
Harless, 459 U.S. 4 (1982)).
59 Harless, 459 U.S. at 6.
60 Id. at 8.
61 Gray v. Netherland, 99 F.3d at 166. Specifically, Gray cited
Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) (holding that defendants who
detrimentally relied on assurance of committee chairman could not be
III. Application in Virginia
Unfortunately, Gray was executed in spite of what anyone can see
as basic unfairness because his attorney did not say "continuance" and
did not say "misrepresentation." In other words, Gray was executed
because of a technicality.
Gray's legal journey raises some important issues that must be
addressed. First, because the Commonwealth, and at times the courts,
will try to divide claims for the purpose of asserting that the issues were
procedurally defaulted, it is imperative that defense counsel argue all
possible claims in both broad and specific terms. Furthermore, more than
just the facts must be presented. Each issue should be tied to a constitu-
tional claim with adequate federal precedent supporting each issue.
Although this court did not specifically address the issue, language
in the opinion indicates that it may be possible to preserve a claim for
default purposes if it is raised at the post-sentence hearing conducted
pursuant to Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5.63 Until this issue is decided,
counsel should continue to make this argument if it is plausible in a
specific case.
Summary and Analysis by
C. Cooper Youell, IV
punished from doing so), and Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935)
(forbidding prosecution from engaging in "a deliberate deception of
court and jury"), as support for his misrepresentation claim. Unfortu-
nately for Gray, however, he had not cited these cases in an earlier
proceeding.
621d.
63 Although unclear, a defendant may be able to have a sentence of
death set aside with a showing of "good cause." Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-
264.5.
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FACTS
On April 12, 1985 Gregory Warren Beaver shot and killed Trooper
Leo Whitt of the Virginia State Police during a routine traffic stop.
Beaver was charged with the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing
of a law enforcement officer for the purpose of interfering with his
official duties under Va. Code § 18.2-3 1(f). I The court appointed John
Maclin IV to represent Beaver and granted Maclin's request to appoint
T.O. Rainey III as co-counsel. Rainey had a private law practice and was
a part-time assistant prosecutor in neighboring Dinwiddie County. 2
I This section has been changed to Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(6).
2 Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186, 1188 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at 1189.
On July 9, 1985, Beaver pleaded guilty to capital murder. The
Commonwealth, in exchange for Beaver's guilty plea, agreed not to
argue the defendant's sentence. The trial court found that the Common-
wealth had proven future dangerousness beyond a reasonable doubt and
sentenced Beaver to death.3 The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed his
conviction and sentence.4 The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari.
5
Beaver, with different court-appointed counsel, filed a petition for
a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Prince George County.
Beaver raised twelve claims in all, ten of which were flatly denied or
4 Beaver v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 521, 352 S.E.2d 342 (1987).
5 Beaver v Commonwealth, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987).
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found to be procedurally barred. The state habeas court ordered an
evidentiary hearing on Beaver's two remaining right to counsel claims:
ineffective assistance of counsel and conflict of interest. After a two day
evidentiary hearing, the state court adopted the factual findings presented
by the Commonwealth and denied these two claims. Beaver appealed.
Again, the Supreme Court of Virginia denied relief and the United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari.
6
Beaver next filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. His request for
an evidentiary hearing on his eleven federal habeas claims, including
conflict of interest and ineffective assistance of counsel, and his motion
for reconsideration were all denied. Beaver then appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, raising five issues including: (1) the
district court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing; (2) a conflict of
interest deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel; and (3)
his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to investigate
and present mitigating evidence.
7
HOLDING
A divided panel of the court of appeals affirmed the district court's
denial of relief.
8
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court of appeals found that Beaver was not entitled to an
evidentiary hearing on his conflict of interest and ineffective assistance
of counsel claims because he was unable to show cause for failing to
adequately develop the material facts at the state habeas proceeding and
prejudice resulting from this failure. 9 The court also held that the state
6 Beaver v. Thompson, 510 U.S. 879 (1993).
7 Beaver v. Thompson, 93 F.3d 1186,1190 (4th Cir. 1996). Beaver's
other two claims, that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary and
that the Virginia capital murder statute is unconstitutional, will not be
discussed in this summary. Beaver argued that Virginia's capital murder
statute is unconstitutionally vague because the language of § 19.2-264.2,
which allows the introduction only of evidence of the defendant's past
criminal record of convictions, and § 19.2-264.4, which permits the
introduction of alleged crimes for which the defendant has not been
convicted, conflict and, in effect, do not give a capital defendant notice
of the kind of evidence that can be used against him to prove future
dangerousness. The court summarily rejected this argument as having
been already decided in LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564,304
S.E.2d 644 (1983).
8 Id. at 1198.
9 Id. at 1190 (emphasis added).
10 1d.
11 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
12 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1192-98.
13 372 U.S. 293,313 (1963) (holding that a federal court must grant
an evidentiary hearing to a habeas applicant if: "(1) the merits of the
factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2) the state factual
determination is not fairly supported by the record as a whole; (3) the
fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of newly
discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately
developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears
that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair
hearing.") (emphasis added).
14504 U.S. 1 (1992).
15 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1190. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states that state
habeas court's finding of no actual conflict was an historical fact entitled
to a presumption of correctness and refused to overturn that finding. 10
Finally, the court held that the performance of Beaver's trial counsel was
not, under Strickland v. Washington,
11 constitutionally ineffective. 12
I. Standard for Federal Evidentiary Hearing
The court upheld the district court's denial of Beaver's request for
a new evidentiary hearing on his conflict of interest and ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. It stated that such a hearing is properly held
"only when the petitioner (1) alleges additional facts that, if true, would
entitle him to relief, and (2) establishes any one of the six factors set out
by the Court in Townsend v. Sain[13l (overruled in part by Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes[14 ) or one of the factors provided in 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)."1 5 The Beaver court's recognition that Tamayo-Reyes partially
overruled Townsend has tremendous practical significance for habeas
practice in Virginia.
In Townsend the United States Supreme Court set forth six circum-
stances in which a federal court must grant an evidentiary hearing. 16 The
fifth circumstance, possibly the broadest of the six, required the district
court to grant a request for an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner
established that material facts were not adequately developed at the state
court hearing. The Court, in Townsend, stated, "If, for any reason not
attributable to the inexcusable neglect of petitioner... evidence crucial
to the adequate consideration of the constitutional claim was not devel-
oped at the state hearing, a federal hearing is compelled."'
17 This
"inexcusable neglect," or, "deliberate bypass," standard expressed by the
Court in Townsend reflected an overall Supreme Court presumption in
favor of meaningful review for federal habeas claims.18
court findings of fact are presumed correct unless the habeas applicant
establishes one of the following circumstances:
(1) that the merits of thefactual dispute werenotresolved in the
State court hearing;
(2) that the fact finding procedure employed by the State court
was not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed
at the State court hearing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter
or over the person of the applicant in the State court proceed-
ing;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in
deprivation of his constitutional right, failed to appoint coun-
sel to represent him in the State court proceeding;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate
hearing in the State court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law
in the State court proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceed-
ing in which the determination of such factual issue was made,
pertinent to the determination of the sufficiency of the evi-
dence to support such factual determination, is produced as
provided for hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consider-
ation of such part of the record as a whole concludes that such
factual determination is not fairly supported by the record.
(emphasis added).
16 372 U.S. at 313. See supra note 13.
17Id. at 317.
18 See Id. at 312-13 ("[A] federal evidentiary hearing is required
unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably found
the relevant facts").
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In Tamayo-Reyes, however, the Supreme Court explicitly adopted
a "cause and prejudice" standard in place of Townsend's "deliberate
bypass" standard for evaluating claims of inadequately developed
evidentiary records. After Tamayo-Reyes, a habeas petitioner requesting
an evidentiary hearing due to inadequate development of material facts
in the state court proceeding, has to show cause for his failure to develop
material facts in the state court proceedings and actual prejudice
resulting from that failure.19 The "cause and prejudice" standard for
evaluating such claims has changed the presumption, from one in favor
of a federal evidentiary hearing, to one deferential to and in favor of state
court findings of fact. Tamayo-Reyes was another step in a long line of
Supreme Court cases signaling a retreat from meaningful review of
federal habeas claims 20 and toward what in all practicality is a pro-death
presumption that state court proceedings were full and fair.
The Beaver court's analysis and approach to Beaver's claim that
material facts were not adequately developed at the state court proceed-
ings demonstrates the degree of specificity required under the "cause and
prejudice" standard to support a request for an evidentiary hearing.
Beaver claimed that his state habeas proceedings were not full and fair
because his "'habeas counsel were not permitted to depose... Beaver's
trial counsel, especially Rainey;' and the state court 'limited the testi-
mony of two of Beaver's expert witnesses and did not permit at all the
testimony of the expert on conflict of interest.' 2 1 In rejecting these
claims, the court applied the cause and prejudice standard to each basis
with considerable rigor. As to the first basis of Beaver's claim, the court
noted, "While [Beaver] describes such interrogatories as 'limited,' any
limitations which were placed upon them he does not disclose."'22 The
court approached the other basis of Beaver's claim in a similar manner:
"We also note that Beaver in his brief does not identify by name of
witness or content the expert witnesses' testimony he now complains was
limited or not permitted .... 23 These and other portions of the opinion
resonate with this theme: when a petitioner requests a federal evidentiary
hearing because of a failure to develop the record in state proceedings, he
must, with code-pleading-like particularity, show cause for this failure
and actual prejudice resulting from it.
For habeas counsel at both the state and federal level the "cause and
prejudice" standard has several practical implications. Federal habeas
counsel is often confronted with the following situation: state habeas
counsel, because of lack of time and resources, did not fully develop the
evidentiary record necessary for adequate consideration of the petitioner's
federal habeas claims. Before Beaver, federal habeas counsel could
expect to get an evidentiary hearing and have time to investigate and
develop the material facts. Now that the court of appeals has ruled that
petitioner must abide by Tamayo-Reyes's "cause and prejudice" stan-
dard, however, the evidentiary record developed at the state level will
almost always be the evidentiary record relied on for analyzing federal
habeas claims. Thus, state habeas counsel must move for extra time
whenever needed in order to investigate and develop the "facts" as fully
19 Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. at 11.
20See e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (199 1); McCleskey
v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977);
Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976).
21 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1190-91.
22 d. at 1191.
231d.
24 See Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus
under the Anti- Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996,
Capital Defense Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 52 (1996). This article
discusses the majorchanges upon habeas corpus law wrought by ATEDA,
including the newly imposed filing deadlines. See also, Eade, The
as possible. This effort is crucial because the presumption that the state
court proceedings were full and fair coupled with the requirement that a
defendant show "cause and prejudice" for his failure to develop material
facts means that it will be the rare exception when a request for a federal
evidentiary hearing is granted. In the vast majority of cases, state habeas
proceedings will be the last opportunity to develop the evidentiary
record.
An indispensable corollary to this lesson is that federal habeas
counsel, when state habeas counsel has been unable to fully develop the
evidentiary record, must make a record as to why the evidence was not
fully developed, as well as how this resulted in prejudice to the petitioner.
Moreover, if the Beaver court's approach is indicative of the degree of
particularity that courts within the Fourth Circuit will require, then the
record must consist of code-pleading-like particularity. For example,
counsel should not only allege that the depositions were limited, but also
detail exactly how they were limited, what questions were asked, what
questions were not asked, and how these limitations resulted in a
violation of petitioner's constitutional rights.
The already difficult task for state habeas counsel, to fully investi-
gate and develop the factual record during the state proceedings, and for
federal habeas counsel, to make a detailed record to satisfy the cause and
prejudice for an evidentiary hearing, is further complicated under the
recently enacted Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (ATEDA).24 ATEDA, for the first time ever, places filing dead-
lines on habeas claims. States are classified as either opt-in or non-opt-
in states.25 The federal habeas filing deadlines for non-opt-in states is one
year from when the judgment becomes final.2 6 It is unclear whether
"finality" occurs upon denial of relief on direct review by the Supreme
Court of Virginia or by conclusion of certiorari proceedings by the
United States Supreme Court. For opt-in states the petitioner has only
180 days from the Supreme Court of Virginia's affirmation of the
conviction and death sentence on direct review to file his federal habeas
claims. 27
Regardless of whether Virginia qualifies as an opt-in or non-opt-in
state, the die has been cast. The imposition of filing deadlines, whether
180 days or one year, when none existed before, significantly deprives
habeas counsel of yet another resource: time. Less time to investigate and
develop the factual record in state habeas will, absent extraordinary
efforts by counsel, lead to inadequate development of the evidentiary
record. At the same time, the likelihood of getting a federal evidentiary
hearing is slim given the heightened requisite showing of "cause and
prejudice" under Tamayo-Reyes coupled with less time under ATEDA
to amass the evidence necessary to make such a showing. An inad-
equately developed evidentiary record will in turn produce meaningless,
not meaningful, review of claims of constitutional violations. In short,
the combined effect of ATEDA and Tamayo-Reyes is clear: federal and
state habeas counsel have to do more in less time and federal courts will
provide less meaningful review in more cases.
Incredible Shrinking Writ Part II: Habeas Corpus under the Anti-
Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Capital Defense
Journal, this issue.
25 The basic difference between the two classifications is that in
order for a state to qualify as an opt-in state under ATEDA's statutory
requirements it has to provide considerably greater procedural protec-
tions and resources to the habeas petitioner than a non-opt-in state. In
exchange for providing a petitioner with more'protections and resources,
an opt-in state gets to impose considerably shorter filing deadlines than
non-opt-in states.
26 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
27 28 U.S.C. § 2263(a).
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II. Conflict of Interest
Thomas 0. Rainey, one of Beaver's defense attorneys, was, at the
time of the trial and in the seven years prior, a part-time assistant
prosecutor in a nearby county. 28 On both state and federal habeas, Beaver
argued that this conflict of interest prevented Rainey from rendering
effective assistance of counsel, violating Beaver's Sixth Amendment
right.29 In rejecting this claim, the court of appeals ignored the relevant
Supreme Court case law and applied the wrong standard of review to the
state habeas court's finding of no actual conflict. The court thereby
avoided analyzing the facts of the case under the relevant Supreme Court
test for conflict of interest.
Cuyler v. Sullivan30 established the test for determining whether a
defense attorney's divided loyalties deprived the accused of his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Cuyler requires that a defendant establish
that "an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance." 3 1 This language seems to require that a defendant estab-
lish two things: (1) that his lawyer had an actual conflict of interest; and
(2) that this actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's
performance. Absent a conflict of interest or a state created impediment
to representation, petitioners claiming denial of effective assistance of
counsel must satisfy the standard established by the United States
Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington. The infamous "prejudice"
prong of Strickland requires claimants to show a reasonable probability
that but For counsel's deficient performance, the outcome would have
been different. 32 Conversely, in Glasser v. United States,33 an early
conflict of interest case, the Court, though discussing some questionable
trial tactics by defense counsel, granted relief without any consideration
of the possible impact of those tactics on the outcome. Thus, it would
appear that, whatever "adversely affected" means under Cuyler, it was
not intended to require a showing related to the probability of a more
favorable outcome had counsel not been representing competing inter-
ests. Rather, given that Glasser is still law, it is plausible that the phrase
"adversely affected" was meant to require no more than conduct provid-
ing corroboration of the basic requirement that conflicting interests were
actively represented. Under that standard, properly interpreted, Beaver
had a strong claim. In Strickland, the Court, interpreting the conflict of
interest test from Cuyler, reached the same conclusion and explained the
rationale behind it:
One type of actual ineffectiveness claim warrants a similar,
though more limited, presumption of prejudice. In Culer...
the Court held that prejudice is presumed when counsel is
burdened by an actual conflict of interest. In those circum-
stances, counsel breaches the duty of loyalty, perhaps the most
basic of counsel's duties. Moreover, it is difficult to measure
theprecise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by
conflicting interests.... Even so, the rule is not quite the per
se rule of prejudice that exists for the Sixth Amendment claims
mentioned above. Prejudice is presumed only if the defendant
28 In 1986, Rainey was appointed as chief prosecutor of Dinwiddie
County, "and has retained the post in several subsequent elections."
Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1198 (Hall, J., dissenting).
29 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1192.
30446 U.S. 335 (1980).
31 Id. at 348.
32 466 U.S. at 694.
33 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
34 466 U.S. at 692.
demonstrates that counsel "actively represented conflicting
interests" and that "an actual conflict of interest adversely
affected his lawyer's performance."
34
The Court has not explicitly said what type or how much of a
showing is required to satisfy Cuyler's "adversely affected perfor-
mance" prong. The Court's treatment of such claims in several other
cases suggests, however, that the type of showing necessary to satisfy this
prong of a conflict of interest claim requires the defendant to "identify an
actual lapse in representation" 35 which, supported by the record, is
attributable to an improper motivation resulting from his lawyer's
conflict of interest.
36
Precisely how much of a showing is required to satisfy the "ad-
versely affected" prong of Cuyler, though not explicitly stated either, is
partially answered by the Court's analysis and discussion in Strickland.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court observed that there are basically three
types of ineffective assistance of counsel claims: (1) actual ineffective-
ness; (2) conflict of interest; and (3) state interference with the right to
effective assistance of counsel. 37 On one end of the spectrum, if the
defendant claims actual ineffectiveness then the Strickland test applies
and he "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."38 On the other end of the spectrum is United States v.
Cronic,39 where the Court held that if the state has interfered with a
defendant's right to counsel then prejudice is presumed. 40 Somewhere in
between the presumption of prejudice and the requirement to show
prejudice lies the "adversely affected his lawyer's performance" prong
of Cuyler. Determining exactly where along this spectrum the second
prong is satisfied, whether the required showing is closer to Cronic or
Strickland, is crucial to a petitioner's ability to obtain relief.
The Court's discussion in Strickland, coupled with the particular
facts of this case, support the argument that only a slight showing of
adverse effect should have been necessary for Beaver to satisfy the
second prong of Cuyler. In Strickland, the court recognized that, "it is
difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation
corrupted by conflicting interests."4 1 Thus, it concluded, a presumption
of prejudice, similar to Cronic but more limited, is called for by Cuyler.
In addition, as the dissent in Beaver correctly observed, Glasser and
Cuyler involved the potential conflict of interest that arises when an
attorney represents multiple defendants, whereas, in this case, the
conflict of interest arose from Rainey's simultaneous representation of
Beaver (for killing a police officer) and his accuser, the Commonwealth.
The dissent, recognizing the constitutional significance of this factual
distinction, stated, "Rainey did not simultaneously represent codefen-
dants whose interests were merely potentially conflicting, but instead
simultaneously represented the opposing party, whose interests, by
definition, were diametrical to those of Beaver."42 Moreover, not only
was Rainey simultaneously representing the Commonwealth and Bea-
ver, but he was also defending Beaver against a charge of capital murder
for the killing of a Virginia State Trooper. In light of these facts, the
dissent found that a conflict of interest existed as a matter of law.
43
35 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349.
36 Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784-88 (1987).
37 466 U.S. at 691-94.
38 Id. at 694.
39 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
40 Id. at 659.
41 466 U.S. at 692.
42 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1199 (Hall, J., dissenting).
43 Id.
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Applying the rationale articulated by the Court in Strickland to the
conflicting interests raised by the facts in this case leads to the conclusion
that Beaver should have had to show only slight evidence of how
Rainey's performance was adversely affected. The majority's only
comment regarding Beaver's attempts to satisfy the second prong of
Cuyler is a statement that the state habeas court "found that Beaver had
presented no evidence that Rainey's conduct of the defense was altered
in any way by his status as a part-time assistant Commonwealth attorney
in Dinwiddie County." 44 The court's statement is somewhat confusing
given that in a later portion of its opinion, which addressed Beaver's
claim of actual ineffectiveness, it noted several instances of conduct by
Beaver's attorneys that fell short of satisfying Strickland's requirement
to show prejudice from deficient performance, but seemingly should
have satisfied the "adversely affected" prong of Cuyler. Those instances
of conduct include: failing to clearly explain to Beaver the terms of the
plea agreement; failing to call Beaver's family members to testify at the
sentencing hearing; calling the Commonwealth's mental health expert to
testify at the sentencing hearing when they knew he had no favorable
testimony to offer, and failing to inform the defendant's mental health
expert of an unadjudicated robbery that they knew the Commonwealth
was going to raise on cross-examination. The court, for no discernible
reason, apparently considered this evidence inapplicable to the "ad-
versely affected performance" prong in its conflict of interest analysis.
The court's analysis treated the conflict of interest claim and actual
ineffectiveness claim as being wholly different. In fact, however, they
are different approaches to the same inquiry, whether Beaver's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. The
court's focus on discrete doctrinal tests, apparently, caused it to overlook
its ultimate inquiry as well as to fail to appreciate how the conflicting
interests raised by the nature of the particular facts in this case were
significantly different than the conflicting interests implicated by repre-
senting co-defendants as exemplified in Glasser and Cuyler.
In this case, neither the majority nor the dissent truly applied the
Cuyler test. The majority, as will be explained briefly, essentially applied
the improper standard of review to the state habeas court's finding of no
actual conflict. The dissent, on the other hand, interpreted Cuyler to say,
"Once the conflict is established, counsel is conclusively presumed to
have rendered ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law."45 The
dissent's conclusion is not completely unwarranted. The following
passage from Cuyler, relied upon by the dissent for its conclusion, rested
heavily on Glasser and seems to adopt Glasser's holding:
Glasser... established that unconstitutional multiple repre-
sentation is never harmless error. Once the court concluded
that Glasser's lawyer had an actual conflict of interest, it
refused "to indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of
prejudice" attributable to the conflict. The conflict itself dem-
onstrated a denial of the "right to effective assistance of
counsel."
46
The Court, in Cuyler, does not claim to overrule Glasser. Indeed,
the Court relies upon it. The test articulated by the Court in Cuyler for
conflict of interest claims, "an actual conflict of interest adversely
affecting his lawyer's performance," however, requires a showing of
adverse effect that the Glasser test (which required the defendant to show
44Id. at 1192.
45 Id. at 1198 (Hall, J., dissenting).
46 Id. (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349).
47 It is unclear from the facts of the case whether Rainey's brief
writing was limited to cases arising in Dinwiddie County or if it included
appeals arising from other areas of Virginia.
only "an actual conflict of interest") did not. Moreover, the rationale for
not requiring a defendant to show prejudice in a conflict of interest claim,
as articulated by the Court in Strickland, is more consistent with the test
announced in Glasser than with Cuyler. Needless to say, the test to be
derived from Cuyler is not entirely clear. Since, however, the specific
language used in Cuyler is that a defendant must establish that an "actual
conflict adversely affected his lawyer's performance," and because the
Court in Strickland interpreted Cuyler as requiring a two-pronged
showing, it is safe to say that it is likely that the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit will require the two-pronged showing.
The court acknowledged that as evidence of the actual conflict,
Beaver adduced testimony from Rainey at the state habeas hearing that
from time to time Rainey represented the Commonwealth in grand jury
proceedings and criminal prosecutions and wrote appellate briefs for
criminal cases on behalf of the Commonwealth's Attorney.47 Moreover,
of great significance in light of the particular facts of this case, Rainey
testified that he had interacted with law enforcement officers, including
Virginia State Troopers, and that such officers would, on occasion,
investigate cases and testify on behalf of the Commonwealth.
48
Rather than rule on the merits of this claim under the test set forth
in Cuyler, the court characterized the state habeas court's finding of"no
actual conflict" as a finding of "historical fact" according to 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), and thus, it was entitled to a "presumption of correctness.
'49
But, as the dissent correctly pointed out, the law in this area could not be
more clear. The determination as to whether a conflict of interest exists
in a particular case is a "'mixed determination of law and fact." 50 Cuyler
is unmistakable on this point. In analyzing a conflict of interest claim
based on multiple representation, the Court in Cuyler stated:
Findings about the roles [Sullivan's lawyers] played in the
defense of Sullivan and his codefendants are facts .... But the
holding that the lawyers who played those roles did not engage
in multiple representation is a mixed determination of law and
fact that requires the application of legal principles to the
historical facts of this case.... That holding is open to review
on collateral attack in a federal court.
5 1
The court of appeals in this case properly employed a presumption
of correctness to historical facts such as whether Rainey interacted with
state troopers or the extent of his duties as a part-time prosecutor. When
the court applied a similar presumption of correctness to the state court's
application of federal constitutional legal principles, however, it contra-
vened Cuyler.
Beaver's conflict of interest claim was not based on multiple
representation but on the fact that one of his defense attorneys was, before
and after the trial, a prosecutor. Thus the appropriate inquiry is two-fold:
(1) Did Rainey actively represent conflicting interests?; (2) If so, did
Rainey's active representation of conflicting interests adversely affect
his performance in representing Beaver in any way? Rainey had, for
seven years, worked as a part-time prosecutor in a nearby county and
resumed this work once Beaver had been convicted. His duties as a
prosecutor could not be effectuated without the assistance and compli-
ance of state law enforcement. There was no indication that Rainey no
longer intended to work as a prosecutor. The notion that he would
zealously defend Beaver with undivided loyalty is not plausible. He was
48 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1192.
491Id.
50 Id. at 1199 (Hall, J., dissenting) (quoting Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 342).
51 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 342.
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employed by the Commonwealth to seek convictions and simulta-
neously was opposing the Commonwealth in order to prevent a convic-
tion. Simply put, Rainey was actively representing conflicting interests.
Aside from the majority's statement that the state habeas court
"found that Beaver had presented no evidence that Rainey's conduct of
the defense was altered in any way by his status as a part-time assistant
Commonwealth attorney in Dinwiddie County, 52 there is no discussion
of whether the facts of this case establish any adverse effect resulting
from Rainey's conflict of interest. To satisfy this prong, Beaver would
have to be able to identify when and how Rainey's performance was
adversely affected by his conflict of interest. If, for example, Beaver
could show that Rainey's decision to seek a plea agreement rather than
to try the case was motivated by his desire to maintain cordial relations
with law enforcement in orderto effectuate his job as assistant prosecutor
he would likely satisfy the second prong. Thus, even if the decision to
seek a plea agreement under similar circumstances would be considered
effective representation, if Rainey's decision was motivated by his
conflicting interest, then prejudice is presumed.
Another disconcerting aspect of this case is the fact that the
majority's opinion, in effect, gave the court's imprimatur to Rainey's
unethical conduct. As a part-time assistant prosecutor in a neighboring
county, Rainey had many possible incentives, such as job maintenance,
job promotion, and community standing, to act other than in Beaver's
best interest. As Beaver's defense attorney, he had the opportunity to do
it. It is both the appearance of impropriety and the opportunity for it
which lies behind the ethical rule that "[a] lawyer shall not accept
employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his
client may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or
personal interest." 53 The Supreme Court has similarly expressed the
belief that "[d]efense counsel have an ethical obligation to avoid conflict-
ing representations."'54 Moreover, one Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
case has gone so far as to suggest that there is a per se conflict of interest
when a prosecutor is appointed to represent a defendant. 55 Finally, a
relatively recent survey of how states deal with part-time prosecutors
acting as court-appointed defense counsel concluded, "In virtually every
state there are ethics opinions stating that a part-time prosecutor may not
defend in criminal cases-not just in the prosecutor's own county but
anywhere else in his or her state. In some states the prohibition has been
enacted into statutory law.' 5 6 One would think, or at least hope, that the
ethical rule against representing conflicting interests would have para-
mount importance in capital defense cases where more often than not the
undivided loyalty of defense counsel is the only refuge and possible
safeguard against community sentiment and Commonwealth efforts to
see the accused executed.
52 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1192.
53 Va. Code Of Professional Responsibility DR 5- 1 01 (A). See also
EC 5-14 which states, "Maintaining the independence of professional
judgment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or continuation
of employment that will adversely affect his judgment on behalf of or
dilute his loyalty to a client."
54 Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 346.
55 Goodson v. Peyton, 351 F.2d 905, 909-10 (4th Cir. 1965).
56 Richard H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of
Interest: A Survey andSome Proposals, 81 Ky.L.J. 1,37 (1992) (discuss-
ing how various state bars have dealt with the ethical issues peculiar to
part-time prosecutors).
57 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1194.
58 Id. at 1195.
59 See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 260, 435 S.E.2d 636
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Beaver claimed that he was rendered ineffective assistance of
counsel because his guilty plea was not knowing and intelligent 57 and
because his counsel failed to adequately investigate and present evidence
in mitigation during the sentencing hearing.
58
The steadfast position of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse
over the years has been that an attorney representing a capital defendant
should not allow him to plead guilty without some formal, or strong
informal, indication from the judge that the sentence will not be death. 59
This case provides another instructive, albeit tragic, example of what
happens when this rule is not heeded. Beaver agreed to plead guilty in
exchange for the Commonwealth's promise "not to argue sentence" and
"to submit the issue of the sentence to the court without comment. '60 A
colloquy between Beaver and one of his attorneys during the sentencing
hearing demonstrates that there was ambiguity in Beaver's mind regard-
ing to what exactly the Commonwealth had agreed. 61 Indeed, the
ambiguity of the plea agreement is borne out by its terms. In other words,
is there really any difference between not arguing sentence and submit-
ting the issue of sentence to the court without comment?
In Lankford v. Idaho62 the Supreme Court had occasion to address
at least one constitutional violation raised by an ambiguous plea agree-
ment. In Lankford, the state had agreed in a pre-trial order not to seek the
death penalty, even though the court had the power to impose it. The trial
court listened to arguments about the appropriate length of the defendant's
sentence even though the real issue the court was contemplating was
whether or not it was going to impose the death sentence. Though neither
side requested or expected it, the judge sentenced Lankford to death. The
Supreme Court, in finding that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
requirement had been violated, stated that "[p]etitioner's lack of ad-
equate notice that the judge was contemplating the imposition of the
death sentence created an impermissible risk that the adversary process
may have malfunctioned in this case."'63 There was, likewise, a risk that
the adversary process malfunctioned in Beaver's case.
Whatever this agreement meant, it did not prevent the Common-
wealth from presenting evidence of the death eligibility factors at the
sentencing phase. The Commonwealth called a clinical psychologist, Dr.
Lee, and psychiatrist, Dr. Dimitris, without objection by either of
Beaver's counsel, to testify as to whether Beaver was a Type B offender,
more non-assertive and passive than most otherfelons, under the Megargee
Typology criteria.64 Dr. Lee testified that even though the Second
Genesis report classified Beaver as a type B personality, he felt that the
Megargee Typology had only a 40% rate of accurate predictions.65 Dr.
Dimitris testified that, according to the Minnesota Multiphasic Person-
ality Inventory, he "predicted that Mr. Beaver would explode. ' 66 After
(1993), and case summary of Dubois, in Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6,
No. 1, p. 2 8 .
60 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1194.
61 While the Commonwealth was presenting evidence during the
sentencing phase, Beaver turned to Maclin and asked if the Common-
wealth could present evidence. Maclin says he responded, "Yes, its
pursuant to our agreement." Id.
62 500 U.S. 110 (1991).
63 Id. at 127.
64The court does not list the criteria for a Type B personality under
the Megargee Typology. The Megargee Typology is a diagnostic test
related to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory.
65 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1198.
66 Id. at 1197.
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considering the testimony of Dr. Lee and Dr. Dimitris, evidence adduced
at trial, and the information contained in the presentence report detailing
Beaver's criminal history, including both adjudicated and unadjudicated
acts, the trial court sentenced the defendant to death, finding future
dangerousness. The end result was that Beaver agreed to waive a host of
Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights in exchange for the Commonwealth's
agreement not to make an argument for the death penalty, although the
Commonwealth could still introduce evidence at the sentencing phase
and seek the death penalty.
The other basis for Beaver's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel was failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence at the
sentencing hearing.67 Beavermade three specific assertions in support of
this claim. First, he asserted that his counsel failed to present significant
and helpful testimony from family members in favor of reports by
various social service agencies and probation officers. Beaver claimed
that his father, Sandy Beaver, should have been called to testify about
Beaver's relationship with his mother, namely that she encouraged and
aided his involvement with drugs and petty crime, including planning a
robbery and assault upon her ex-husband which Beaver carried out.
Beaver claimed that his counsel failed to elicit similar testimony from his
wife regarding his mother's influence on him and failed to call his
mother.
68
Rainey testified that the strategy for sentencing was to portray
Beaver as a troubled young man with many problems in his upbringing.
Rainey also testified that the social service and probation reports sup-
ported their strategy, and that he was concerned that family members
were susceptible to being discredited on cross-examination by the
prosecutor. This justification is somewhat confusing. If Rainey's strat-
egy was to show harmful experiences on Beaver from members of his
family, their credibility on the stand would hardly seem to be a significant
concern. At the very least, there is no discernible, rational reason offered
in the opinion as to why it was reasonable not to call any of Beaver's
family members to testify, other than the conclusion that reliance on
written reports in the record was a reasonable tactical decision.
The court found defense counsels' decision to rely on the credibility
of the state reports rather than call Beaver's family members for fear that
they might "testify adversely to Beaver's interests on cross-examination
was reasonable trial strategy that was within the objective standard of
reasonable effective assistance."'69 This statement misses the point.
Defense counsels' decision was not, "Should we present the state
reports?" or "Should we present testimony by Beaver's family mem-
bers?" Their decision was "What evidence should we present to persuade
the court not to impose the death penalty?" Simply put, there was nothing
to prevent defense counsel from presenting both state reports and
testimony by family members at the sentencing phase. Given Rainey's
stated strategy, testimony that would support it would cast Beaver's
family members and his upbringing in a negative light. The only kind of
testimony that would appear to undermine this strategy would still be
testimony by good, upstanding people who loved and cared for Beaver.
There was no evidence of that from any source. 70 Defense counsels'
failure to present testimony by Beaver's family members, when it was a
win-win situation, was unreasonable.
Second, Beaver claimed that the decision by his attorneys to call the
Commonwealth's expert witness, Dr. Dimitris, to testify regarding
67 Id. at 1195.
68Id.
69 Id. at 1196 (relying on Burger, 483 U.S. at 788-95).
70 Id. at 1196.
71 Id.
72Id.
Beaver's future dangerousness constituted ineffective assistance. A
week before trial, Dr. Dimitris told Rainey that he could not offer
evidence in Beaver's favor. Rainey testified that he did not expect the
testimony of Dr. Dimitris to be helpful but thought that the doctor might
make some points beneficial to Beaver. The court stated:
On questioning from the court as to the broader question of the
likelihood of future criminal conduct Dr. Dimitris replied that
it was his impression that Mr. Beaver had not profited from his
experiences in the Second Genesis program. We think this
testimony is, as his attorneys had hoped, more helpful to
Beaver than harmful.
71
The court offered no further explanation for this conclusion, other
than to state that the decision to call Dr. Dimitris was a reasonable tactical
decision to control the presentation of evidence to diminish the force and
effect of his testimony. 72 For capital defense attorneys in Virginia who
practice in the best interests of the defendant, it should be clear: do not
call the Commonwealth's mental health expert as your witness when you
know he has no helpful testimony to offer. The court's conclusion that
this was a reasonable tactical decision by Beaver's counsel sends a
bewildering message to capital defense attorneys about what constitutes
reasonable tactical decisions: not calling the defendant's family mem-
bers to testify and calling the Commonwealth's expert to offer unfavor-
able testimony constitutes reasonably effective assistance of counsel.
Beaver's third assertion was that his counsel were ineffective
because they "failed to inform... Dr. Reddy of Beaver's alleged assault
on his stepfather" and failed to independently corroborate the informa-
tion Beaver gave to his attorneys and upon which Dr. Reddy relied.73 Dr.
Reddy, the defendant's psychiatric expert, was given reports and records
detailing Beaver's juvenile offenses and his convictions in Maryland.
74
Based on this information, Dr. Reddy testified that Beaver did not pose
a future danger to society. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Reddy
testified that he was not aware of the unadjudicated robbery and assault
upon the ex-husband ofBeaver's motherand"that this information might
influence his opinion as to Beaver's future violence to some degree."
'75
Beaver contended that the surprise of Dr. Reddy, in learning of an alleged
assaultby Beaverfor the first time on the witness stand, caused Dr.Reddy
to lose credibility.
76
The first basis of this claim by Beaver, that his counsel were
ineffective because they failed to inform Dr. Reddy of this alleged
assault, was not addressed by the court. Indeed, it would be difficult to
justify not informing Dr. Reddy of this alleged assault in light of the fact
that defense counsel were fully aware of it and of the fact that the
Commonwealth intended to introduce it against Beaver at the sentencing
hearing. As the court recognized in a footnote in an earlier portion of its
opinion:
There is no claim here that Beaver did not have notice of the
introduction of evidence with respect to an incident of his
robbery of his stepfather, of which he had not been convicted.
... His attorneys knew about the robbery of his step-father and
discussed the matter prior to trial.
77
73 Id. at 1196-97.
74Id.
75 Id. at 1197.
76 1d. at 1196.
77 1d. at 1191 n. 5.
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Perhaps there was no discussion of whether this particular omission
was a"reasonable trial strategy" because it simply could not be justified.
It should go without saying that expert witnesses must be informed of all
relevant evidence that will be presented to the tribunal.
78
Beaver also argued that his counsel had a duty to investigate and
independently corroborate the information provided by Beaver upon
which Dr. Reddy relied. But the court stated, "we know of no authority
that required Beaver's counsel to insure Beaver's truthfulness to Dr.
Reddy or themselves while engaged on his behalf. We hold there is no
such obligation and are of the opinion that this claim is frivolous."
79
While the court at an earlier juncture in its opinion noted that under
Strickland a defense attorney has a duty to make reasonable investigation
into mitigating factors,80 this passage seems to indicate that the duty of
reasonable investigation into mitigating factors does not include a duty
to investigate and independently corroborate what the defendant says.
The court's specific holding that a defense attorney has no duty to
investigate and independently corroborate the defendant's statements
demonstrates the court's practice of characterizing what constitutes
reasonable investigation depending upon what is at stake for the defen-
dant.
A comparison of two recent decisions by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit demonstrates this practice in action. In Stout v.
Netherland,81 the court reversed the district court's finding that the
failure of Stout's defense counsel to investigate and present virtually any
case in mitigation was constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
in light of the overwhelming evidence of mitigation evidence available
and the five month hiatus in the sentencing phase.82 In reversing the
district court, a panel of the court of appeals stated, "[A] federal habeas
court must not second-guess counsel's strategic choices, particularly
those choices related to the investigation of mitigation evidence, which
must be evaluated . . . 'applying a heavy measure of deference to
counsel's judgments.' ' 83 A heavy measure of deference is applied in
Stout as evidenced by the court's holding: "[In light of the detailed
descriptions of Stout's background contained in the psychological re-
port, there can be little doubt that [Stout's defense attorney] was ad-
equately apprised of the relevant information; thus, there was no lack of
investigation."'84 Apparently, under this "heavy deference" standard, as
long as the defense attorney reads the psychological report and it apprises
him of the defendant's background, he has satisfied his duty to conduct
a reasonable investigation into mitigating factors.
What constitutes "reasonable investigation" depends, however,
upon whether the law in question is beneficial or detrimental to the
78 The court's response that Beaver denied the incident and lied to
his attorneys is irrelevant to the expert's lack of preparation to meet
something the Commonwealth was sure to raise.
79 Beaver, 93 F.3d at 1197.
80 1d. at 1195.
81 1996 WL 496601 (4th Cir. (Va.) September 3, 1996).
82 Id. at *9.
83 Id. at *10 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691).
84 Id. at *11.
85,92 F.3d 1350 (4th Cir. 1996).
defendant. The defendant in Hoke v. Netherland85 certainly did not get
the benefit of any judicial deference toward the investigation conducted
by his attorney. In Hoke, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor
violated his Brady86 right to exculpatory evidence, by concealing the
testimony of three men who claimed to have had sex with the victim.
87
This evidence of the victim's promiscuity directly contradicted the
prosecutor's portrayal of the victim as a kindly old lady. The court of
appeals, however, reversed the district court's finding of a Brady
violation on the basis that had Hoke's defense attorney undertaken a
"reasonable and diligent" investigation he would have learned of these
three witnesses. 88 The court described the defense attorney's investiga-
tion as limited by the fact that he only visited the restaurant the victim
frequented two to four times and interviewed only five to seven people.89
The court further noted:
Hoke never even attempted to contact any of Stell's friends or
acquaintances who were not patrons of the... [riestaurant, or
to visit other restaurants, bars, or business establishments
frequented by Stell .... [T]here is no evidence that Hoke's
attorney even attempted to learn about Stell's relationships
from her neighbors and friends in the apartment complex.90
In short, the Hoke majority found that the defendant could have
easily discovered two of these three men, and with reasonable certainty
the third man, despite evidence in the record that people at the restaurant
were hostile to the defense attorney and that police only discovered such
evidence after having to press at least one of the men for information.9 1
The court, undoubtably, applied an entirely different concept of
what constitutes a reasonable investigation in Hoke than it did in Stout
and Beaver. One might think that the difference could be explained as
involving different legal standards, the former case involving Brady and
the latter two cases involving Strickland. But, in United States v.
Bagley,92 the Supreme Court held that the standard for evaluating
"materiality" under Brady claims is the same as the standard used for
evaluating"prejudice" underStrickland. The most distressing aspect that
emerges from comparing these three cases is that it appears that how the
law affects the outcome of a defendant's claim is the most important
factor for gauging how much investigation is required for reasonable-
ness.
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86Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that due process
requires the government to turn over to the defendant evidence that is
favorable and material to the guilt or punishment of the defendant).
87 Hoke, 92 F.3d at 1354.
88 1d. at 1355.
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